Abstract
Introduction
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard [7] proposed a revolutionary concept that key distribution may be accomplished through public communications in quantum channels. Hopefully, the privacy of the resulted key is to be guaranteed by quantum physical laws alone, quite independent of how much computational resource is available to the adversary. The primary quantum phase of the proposed protocol is a sequence of single photons produced by Alice (the sender) and detected by Bob (the receiver).
The security proof of the BB84-protocol (or its many variants) for adversaries with unrestricted power is a difficult mathematical problem, and has only been achieved with any generality in the last few years. In brief, the BB84-This research was supported in part by DIMACS, and by DARPA/ITO and the National Science Foundation under Grant CCR-9627819.
protocol is secure even with channel noise and possible detector faults for Bob, provided that the apparatus used by Alice to produce the photons is perfect. The purpose of this paper is to remove this last assumption, by proposing and giving a concrete design for a new concept, selfchecking source, which requires the manufacturer of the photon source to provide certain tests; these tests are designed such that, if passed, the source is guaranteed to be adequate for the security of the BB84-protocol, even though the testing devices may not be built to the original specification. A self-checking source must receive inputs from multiple locations (two in our case) and returns classical outcomes at these locations. The test needs only to consider the classical inputs and the classical outcomes.
It is well known that there are clever ways to construct imperfect sources for the coding used in the BB84-protocol that behave quite normal on the surface, but seriously compromise the security. In other words, the BB84 coding together with the standard test executed in the BB84-protcol are problematic because the external data can be reproduced by quantum apparatus which are not secure at all. We propose a different source that is self-checking and yet can be used to generate the BB84 coding. Our result means that one does not have to perform an infinite number of ways to check all possible devious constructions. In some ways our test can be regarded as simple self-testing quantum programs. Our result requires that, when the inputs to the source are fixed, the distribution of probability for the classical outcomes is also fixed.
Our result is that, if these distributions of probability (associated with the different inputs) are exactly as in the specification for our self-checking source, the state transmitted is a direct sum of states that are individually normally emitted by a perfect source. In practice, we cannot expect these probabilities to be exactly as in the specification for the selfchecking source. However, one can test that they are not too far away from this specification. Furthermore, one should expect that the closer to their specified values these probabilities will be, the closer to the direct sum described above the source will be. This is usually sufficient to prove security.
In Section 2, we show how the main mathematical question arises from the security requirement from the BB84-protocol. In Section 3, the precise question is formulated, and the main theorem stated. The proof of the main theorem is given in Section 4.
Preliminaries
Ideally, the objective of key distribution is to allow two participants, typically called Alice and Bob, who initially share no information, to share a secret random key (a string of bits) at the end. A third party, usually called Eve, should not be able to obtain any information about the key. In reality, this ideal objective cannot be realized, especially if we give unlimited power to the cheater, but a quantum protocol can achieve something close to it. See [8] (and more recently [28] ) for a detailed specification of the quantum key distribution task. One of the greatest challenges in quantum cryptography is to prove that a quantum protocol accomplishes the specified task. One can experimentally try different kinds of attacks, but one can never know in which way the quantum apparatus can be defective. In any case, such experiments are almost never done in practice because it is not the way to establish the security of quantum key distribution. The correct way is a properly designed protocol together with a security proof.
Recently, there has been a growing interest in practical quantum cryptography and systems have been implemented [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] . However, proving the security of quantum key distribution against all attacks turned out to be a serious challenge. During many years, many researchers directly or indirectly worked on this problem [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] . Using novel techniques [20, 21] , a proof of security against all attacks for the quantum key distribution protocol of Bennett and Brassard was obtained in 1996 [22] . Related results were subsequently obtained [23, 24, 25, 26] , but as yet [22] is the only known proof of security against all attacks. A more recent version of the proof with extension to the result is proposed in [28] . Also, the basic ideas of [9, 10, 17 ] might lead to a complete solution if we accept fault tolerant computation (for example, see [27] ), but this is not possible with current technology.
In the quantum transmission, Alice sends n photons to uniformly chosen at random.
The basic idea of the protocol is the following. Both, Eve and Bob, do not know Alice's bases until after the quantum transmission. Eve cannot obtain information without creating a disturbance which can be detected. Bob also disturbs the state when he uses the wrong basis, but this is not a problem. After the quantum transmission, Alice and Bob announce their bases. Alice and Bob share a bit when their bases are identical, so they know which bits they share. The key point is that it's too late for Eve because the photons are on Bob's side. However, the security of the protocol relies on the fact that the source behaves as specified, and this is the main subject of this paper.
Informally, the source used in the original BB84-protocol [7] can be described as a blackbox with two buttons on it: base2-button and base3-button. When Alice pushes the base2-button, the output is either 0; b 0; 2 or 1; b 1; 2, where b0; 2 and b1; 2 form an orthonormal basis of a two-dimensional system H B , with each possibility occurring with probability 1=2. After the basebutton is pushed, of the output x; bx; , only the vector bx; goes out to Bob; bit x is only visible to Alice. Similarly, if Alice pushes the base3-button, the output is either 0; b 0; 3 or 1; b 1; 3, with each possibility occurring with probability 1=2, where b0; 3 = b0; 2 + b1; 2= p 2; b1; 3 = ,b0; 2 + b1; 2= p 2:
The suggested way in [7, 8] to achieve the above is to have the blackbox generates a fixed state, say b0; 2, then the bit x 2 f0; 1g is uniformly chosen at random and this state is rotated of an appropriate angle to create the desired state bx; (assuming that the base -button is pressed).
The security proof of the protocol extends to sources beyond mentioned above. To obtain our self-testing source, we need to consider a different type of sources. This is without loss of generality for our result, as we will see.)
Let P + ; P , , where 2 f2; 3g, denote the projection operators to the subspaces corresponding to the outcomes 0; 1 for measurement M . (We sometimes use the notation P to denote the measurement M itself.) After performing the measurement, only the coordinates in H B are made available for transmission. Thus, if button is pushed with outcome 0, the density operator in the transmitted beam is tr A P + j ih jP + . For convenience, we sometimes identify + with 0, and , with 1. Thus, if button is pushed with outcome x, the density operator is tr A P x j ih jP x .
The security proof of the protocol is valid if the source satisfies, for x 2 f 0; 1g, the conditions tr A P x 2 j ih jP x 2 = jbx; 2ihbx; 2j=2; tr A P x 3 j ih jP x 3 = jbx; 3ihbx; 3j=2; (2) where b0; 2; b 1; 2 and b0; 3; b 1; 3 are orthonormal bases that satisfy equation (1) .
It is well known (and easy to see) that the fol- respectively. Now observe that the following are true for 6 = 2 f 2; 3g, x; y 2 f +; ,g, jjP x j ijj 2 = 1=2; jjR y P x j ijj 2 jjP x j ijj 2 = x;y ; jjR y P x j ijj 2 jjP x j ijj 2 = 1=2:
We can ask the manufacturer to provide in addition two measuring devices outside the blackbox corresponding to N 2 ; N 3 . A test can be executed to verify that these equations are satisfied (see the related discussion in the Introduction). Furthermore, as a matter of physical implementation, to make sure that M 0 s and N 0 s operate on H A , H B respectively, we can further demand that the buttons are replaced by two measuring devices outside the blackbox. Is that sufficient to guarantee that we have at least an extended perfect system? Unfortunately, the answer is NO. It is not hard to construct examples where (4) is satisfied, but it is not an extended ideal system (and in fact, security is gravely compromised).
However, as we will see, if we add one more measurement appropriately on each side, and perform the corresponding checks, then it gurantees to be an extended perfect system. That will be the main result of this paper. 
Main Theorem

Fact 2
The conjugate coding source obtained from an extended ideal source must be an extended perfect system. The converse of fact 1 is our main theorem.
Main Theorem Any self-checking source is an extended ideal source.
It follows from the Main Theorem and Fact 2 that a selfchecking source provides an adequate source for the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [7, 8] .
We remark that in our definition of self-checking source, the restriction of the initial state to a pure state j i instead of a mixed state is not a real restriction. Given a source with a mixed state satisfying equation (6), we can construct one with a pure state j i (by enlarging appropriately H A ) satisfying (6) . We can apply the Main Theorem to this new source, and conclude that it also gives rise to an adequate source for the BB84-protocol. It is well known, from discussions about EPR Experiments (see e.g. [29] ), that quantities such as jjR x P y j ijj 2 exhibit behavior characteristic of quantum systems that cannot be explained by classical theories. One may view our main result as stating that such constraints are sometimes strong enough to yield precise structural information about the given quantum system; in this case it has to be an orthogonal sum of EPR pairs
Proof of Main Theorem
We give in this Section a sketch of the main steps in the proof. Let S = H A H B ; j i; P 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 ; R 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 be a self-checking source. We show that it must be an extended ideal source. In Section 4.1, we derive some structural properties of the projection operators as imposed by the self-checking conditions, but without considering in details the constraints due to the tensor product nature of the state space. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, the state is decomposed explicitly in terms of tensor products, and the properties derived in Section 4.1 are used to show that this decomposition satisfies the conditions stated in the Main Theorem.
Properties of Projections
In this subsection, we present some properties of the projected states (such as P + 1 ; P + 1 R ,
2 ) as consequences of the constraints put on self-checking sources. The proofs of these lemmas are somewhat lengthy, and will be left to the complete paper. Since there is a symmetry between the projection operators P and R, the following is clearly true.
Lemma 5 Lemmas 2-4 remain valid if the projection oper-
ators P and R are exchanged.
The Decomposition
We now prove that the state 2 H A H B can be decomposed into the direct sum of EPR pairs. We begin with a decomposition of P + 1 , which is equal to R + 
Concluding Remarks
The security problem for imperfect source is a difficult one to deal with. The present paper is a step in only one possible direction. We have also limited ourselves to the simplist case when the correlation probabilities p ; x; y are assumed to be measurable precisely. We leave open as future research topics for extensions to more general models.
